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When Mediation Confidentiality and
Substantive Law Clash: an Inquiry
Into the Impact of In re Marriage of
Kieturakis on California's
Confidentiality Law
By Annalisa L. H. Peterson$
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation confidentiality laws play a critical role in allowing mediation
to remain a viable process for parties to discuss the issues involved in their
dispute, exchange information, and potentially reach a settlement before
trial. Without certain guarantees as to the confidential nature of such a
meeting, no savvy party or attorney would agree to provide information that
could later be turned against him at trial, and many valuable opportunities
(as measured in time, cost, reputation, relationship, etc.) for resolution would
be lost. However, some parties to mediated disputes either do not reach
resolution, or later contest a mediated agreement in court. In these
situations, what happens when the rules that govern mediation
confidentiality are incompatible with the substantive law governing the case,
to the point of being mutually exclusive? Is there a framework for judges to
use in determining whether one set of laws should trump the other? Must
the outcome always be at the expense or benefit of either substantive law or
mediation confidentiality?
In March of 2006, the California Court of Appeal faced this scenario in
deciding In re Marriage of Kieturakis, a case in which mediation
confidentiality law was in conflict with the state's substantive law regarding
t Annalisa Peterson is a joint J.D. and Master in Dispute Resolution candidate at Pepperdine
University School of Law. She will graduate in May 2008. Before law school, Ms. Peterson worked
at Chicago's Center for Conflict Resolution as Manager and later Director of Mediation Services.
She is the Editor-in-Chief of Volume Eight of the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal.
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marital dissolution settlements.' Parts II and III of this article will begin by
considering California's mediation confidentiality law, the exceptions that
have developed thereto, and the outcome of the Kieturakis case.2 Part IV
will discuss the likely impact of the case on California law and the practice
of mediation.3 Part V will examine how other jurisdictions and the Uniform
Mediation Act (UMA) have approached similar conflicts between mediation
confidentiality and substantive law.4 Finally, Part VI will question whether
holdings such as Kieturakis increase mediator responsibility for ensuring the
fairness of a settlement, as traditional safeguards against inequality may no
longer apply to parties contesting a mediated settlement.'
II. CALIFORNIA'S MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY LA WAND ITS EXCEPTIONS
California's mediation confidentiality provisions, codified in the
California Evidence Code (CEC), are known for their strictness.6 Very few
exceptions to confidentiality exist, and those that do are consistently
narrowly construed.7 To summarize the pertinent sections of the CEC,
evidence of statements or writings "made for the purpose of, in the course
of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation" is inadmissible
and not subject to discovery.8 Mediators are not competent to testify to
statements or conduct that occurred in relation to mediation in subsequent
civil proceedings, except where such information could "give rise to civil or
criminal contempt,. . . constitute a crime, . . . [or] be the subject of
investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial Performance."
' 9
Additionally, mediator reports, recommendations or evaluations "of any
kind" of a mediation proceeding may not be considered in later adjudicative
proceedings, unless a report is required "by court rule or other law and...
1. In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56 (Ct. App. 2006).
2. See infra notes 6-41 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 59-93 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
6. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 64 (2006); see also Peter Robinson,
Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation
Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings Should be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. DISP.
RESOL. 135, 138 (2003).
7. See ADRWorld.com, California Court Reinforces Strict Mediation Confidentiality
Standards (citing Fair v. Bakhtiari, 40 Cal. 4th 189 (2006)), http://www.adrworld.com/sp.asp
?id=40618 (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 1119 (West 1997).
9. Cal. Evid. Code § 703.5 (West 1994).
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states only whether an agreement was reached."' 1  Parties to a mediation
may also choose to circumvent this rule by expressly agreeing otherwise."
The CEC provides for limited exceptions to the confidentiality of written
settlement agreements prepared in connection to mediation. 12  Written
settlement agreements that have been signed by all parties are not
inadmissible or undiscoverable under the CEC if:
(a) the agreement provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure, or words to that
effect; (b) the agreement provides that it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect;
(c) all parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing, or orally in accordance with
[the CEC], to its disclosure; or (d) the agreement is used to show fraud, duress, or
illegality that is relevant to an issue in dispute.
Though the California Supreme Court has notably overturned several
common law exceptions to mediation confidentiality that lower courts have
articulated since the mid-1990s,14 others have retained their force. For
instance, where a party's freedom is "at risk and thus constitutional due
process concerns are triggered," the importance of preserving constitutional
rights outweighs that of preserving confidentiality in mediation, and
normally protected information may be admitted to the extent necessary to
impeach inconsistent testimony. 15 Additionally, a mediator's testimony may
be compelled (in camera) where the parties request it and waive the
mediation privilege, and where not compelling the testimony would cause
greater harm than would compelling the mediator's testimony and forcing a
breach of confidentiality.' 6  In other words, there is an exception to
confidentiality where there is waiver of the privilege and "when a balancing
of the need to do justice in a case against the potential for discouraging
mediation weighs in favor of compelling a mediator to testify."' 7  Such
10. Cal. Evid. Code § 1121 (West 1997).
11. See id.
12. Id. §1123.
13. Id.
14. See Rojas v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 4th 407 (2004) (overturning court of appeal holding that
"pure evidence" was not intended to be protected under the CEC's mediation confidentiality
provisions, and that confidential evidence from mediation was discoverable upon a showing of good
cause); see also Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 1 (2001)
(overturning court of appeal holding that mediation confidentiality provisions were only intended to
apply to cases in which the parties and their lawyers participated in mediation in good faith).
15. L. Randolph Lowry & Peter Robinson, Mediation Confidential, 24-MAY L.A. LAW. 28,
30 (2001) (citing Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Ct. App. 1998)).
16. See Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
17. In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56 (Ct. App. 2006).
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evidence must be the most reliable and probative evidence on the issue, there
must be no alternative source of evidence, and the testimony must be
essential to the just resolution of the case. 8 Finally, where following the
plain meaning of a statute would "frustrate[ ] the manifest purposes of the
legislation as a whole or [lead] to absurd results," judges may construe the
statutory language in order to avoid capricious results unintended by the
Legislature.' 9  Though this last exception is technically applicable to
mediation confidentiality, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly
expressed disapproval for "judicially crafted exception[s] to the mediation
confidentiality statutes," noting that "the statutory scheme... unqualifiedly
bars disclosure of communications made during mediation absent an express
statutory exception., 20  In other words, it would take an exceptional
circumstance to persuade the California Supreme Court that following the
plain meaning of the CEC's exacting mediation confidentiality provisions
would frustrate the legislative purpose of "encourag[ing] mediation by
permitting the parties to frankly exchange views, without fear that
disclosures might be used against them in later proceedings.1
2l
In Kieturakis, an issue of first impression was put to the California
Court of Appeal which presented the possibility for a new line of exceptions
to the state's strict stance on mediation confidentiality: When mediation
confidentiality provisions conflict with the substantive law of the case,
which law yields? 22 Analogous conflicts have arisen in California law,23 but
never before with regard to confidentiality in mediation.
IX. THE CASE OF INRE KIETURAKIS: A CONFLICT OF LAWS?
In conjunction with the dissolution of their marriage, Anna and Maciej
Jan Kieturakis participated in mediation and reached a marital settlement
agreement (MSA).24 Two years after they reached this agreement, Anna
sought to overturn the MSA, asserting that it had been reached under duress,
18. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39.
19. Cal. Sch. Employees Ass'n v. Governing Bd., 8 Cal. 4th 333, 340 (1994) (quoting People
v. Bellecci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 884 (1979)).
20. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 40 Cal. 4th 189, 194 (2006) (quoting Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Bramalea Cal., Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 1, 14-15 (2001).
21. Fair, 40 Cal. 4th at 194 (quoting Foxgate, 26 Cal. 4th at 14).
22 See Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 89.
23. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 302 (Ct. App. 1995) (public
policy requires that a presumption of undue influence in interspousal transaction prevail over
common-law community property state of title presumption, where the two are in conflict).
24. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 61.
202
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fraud, and undue influence. 5 The trial court found that the terms of the
settlement agreement were more favorable to Maciej than to Anna. 6 Under
California family law, "whenever [married] parties enter into an agreement
in which one party gains an advantage, the advantaged party bears the
burden of demonstrating that the agreement was not obtained through undue
influence. ' 27 This rule applies to marital settlement agreements even though
the confidential nature of the couple's relationship generally no longer exists
after separation has occurred.2 8 Maciej sought to introduce evidence from
the mediation in order to meet his burden of rebutting the presumption of the
validity of Anna's claims. 2 9 However, Anna refused to waive her mediation
confidentiality privilege, and Maciej was thus unable to defend himself
against her claim. 30  The trial court, confronted with "the most difficult
[legal issue] it had ever faced," admitted the evidence from mediation,
reasoning that it had to do so in order to uphold fairness and the effective
administration of justice. 3'
On appeal, the issue of first impression was: Whether a spouse should
be required to bear the burden of disproving the presumption of undue
influence that arises when a dissolution settlement agreement unequally
benefits him or her, where the marital settlement was reached in mediation
and is thus protected from disclosure.32 The court of appeal held that,
though the MSA clearly favored Maciej, the presumption of undue influence
could not be applied to the case, for "three independently sufficient
reasons." 33  The first of those reasons-the fundamental nature of
confidentiality in mediation-is the issue with which this article is
concerned.34 The court held that a presumption of undue influence cannot
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id. at 75.
27. In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1, 27 (2000) (citing Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 293):
see also Cal. Fam. Code § 72 1(b) (2003).
28. See Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th at 27; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e), 2102 (West 2003).
29. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 66.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 75 (relying on Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
32. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 89.
33. Id. at 85.
34. The second and third reasons that the court of appeal gave for not applying the
presumption of undue influence to the case involved the "public policy of assuring finality of
judgments," and the fact that Anna and Maciej "acknowledged in the MSA that no undue influence
was exercised," and their capacity to do so freely was not in question. Id. at 90.
203
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be applied to marital settlement agreements reached through mediation,
period. 35 The court reasoned that because "voluntary participation and self-
determination are fundamental principles of mediation," mediators can be
"expected to consider it their duty to attempt to determine whether the
parties are 'acting under their own free will' in the mediation. ' '3 6 The court
also opined that applying the presumption "to mediated marital settlements
would severely undermine the practice of mediating such agreements"
because it would "turn the shield of mediation confidentiality into a sword
by which any unequal agreement could be invalidated," a result not intended
by the legislature in providing for either of the conflicting provisions. 37
Avoiding this result by allowing mediation evidence to be discovered was
not a valid option either. The court affirmed that "the mediation privilege is
broadly framed and strictly construed. Mediation communications are
generally shielded from disclosure unless all participants expressly agree
otherwise. This 'supermajority' requirement... effectively creates a 'super
privilege' impenetrable by public policies favoring disclosure.
3 8
Ultimately, the court concluded that, since the presumption of undue
influence could not be applied in this case as to Maciej, the burden shifted
back to Anna to establish undue influence. 39 The court did not reach the
issue of whether the trial court properly compelled the mediator's testimony
because it determined that Anna "ha[d] no prospect of meeting her burden of
proof' regardless of the mediator having testified. 40  The court therefore
deemed harmless any error that may have resulted from the trial court's
decision to compel the mediator's testimony.4'
IV. KIETURAKIS' IMPACT ON STATE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF
MEDIATION IN CALIFORNIA
Does Kieturakis constitute victory, defeat or something more nuanced
for proponents of the use of mediation? On the one hand, the case decisively
upholds mediation confidentiality, citing California's "broadly framed and
strictly construed" mediation privilege42 and its "strong policy encouraging
35. Id. at 85.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 85-86 (quoting Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and
Informational Privileges and the Case of the Mysterious Mediation Privilege, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
537,588 (2004)).
39. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 91.
40. Id. at 93-94.
41. Id. at91,94.
42. Id. at 85.
204
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settlements" as its rationale.43 On the other hand, the case creates different
standards for the admissibility of evidence, and different burdens of proof as
between mediated and non-mediated marital settlement agreements, a result
for which, as the court conceded, there exists rational criticism.44 The court
recognized that its decision would put parties defending mediated marital
settlements "at an advantage," since they can refuse to waive mediation
confidentiality, and "thereby prevent their settlements from effectively being
challenged.'45  However, with the goals of protecting mediation
confidentiality and redressing undue influence placed head to head, the court
found that the "super privilege" of mediation confidentiality has the upper
hand: "[I]f there is a price to be paid in fairness to preserve mediation
confidentiality, the cases have required that it be paid by parties challenging,
not defending, what transpired in mediation.
4 6
The rule of Kieturakis could serve as a disincentive for parties to
participate in mediation of marital property settlements, because parties
fearful of a spouse's influence may feel too unprotected to mediate.
However, as mentioned above, the court viewed the alternative of applying
the presumption of undue influence to mediated marital settlements as even
more dangerous to the cause of promoting mediation. It stated that "[i]f, by
virtue of the mediation privilege and the presumption of undue influence,
any such favorable bargain could, as we have posited, be set aside at the
option of the disappointed party, the effectiveness of mediation as a method
of settling marital property disputes would be greatly impaired., 4' This
estoppel-tinged rationale led the court to view its decision as a choice
"between a rule that may allow some unfair agreements to stand and a rule
that jeopardizes all unequal agreements., 48 Ultimately, it may simply have
come down to numbers. Encouraging settlement is a policy of great
importance in California, and the court seems to have concluded that far
more parties would be dissuaded from mediating by a rule that put all
unequal agreements at risk, than a rule removing one of multiple
43. Id. at 87.
44. Id. (citing Ellen Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law
Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 33, 102 (2001) ("[g]iven the importance of
both confidentiality and full consent to mediated settlements, an inflexible rule in favor of ensuring
one but not the other of these values is inappropriate.")).
45. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 87.
46. Id. at 85, 87 (citing Eisendrath v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. App. 4th 351 (Ct. App. 2003)).
47. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 86.
48. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
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preventative measures against undue influence. Was the Kieturakis court
right in its calculations? Will this new rule serve as less of a disincentive to
settlement than an alternative ruling would have? The answer to these
questions will depend on how the rule of Kieturakis is--or is not-extended
in other circumstances. A related question remains as to whether the court
could have enunciated a more compromising rule that would have been more
apt to both preserve confidentiality and redress undue influence.
As the court of appeal recognized, critics of Kieturakis object to fixed
rules favoring mediation confidentiality over other important policies.
49
Critics may also be concerned that rulings such as Kieturakis will be a
slippery slope that leads to further override of substantive law in deference
to California's strict rule of mediation confidentiality. Scholars have
expressed concern about the potential consequences that will result if
mediated agreements are "effectively exempt from the established standards
[of contract common law]."5° The chief concern of this view relates to the
potential for parties to abuse the system, in that "an individual intending
abusive negotiation strategies like fraud or coercion could insist on
negotiating in a mediation and then cling to his right of confidentiality when
enforcing the suspect agreement. 5 1 Concern about fraud was also present in
the Kieturakis opinion, but the court approached the issue from a different
angle:
[I]n the case of a mediated marital settlement agreement to which the presumption of
undue influence attached, the disadvantaged party could claim, for example, to have
acted under duress, refuse to waive the privilege, and thereby prevent the other party
from introducing the evidence required to carry the burden of proving that no duress
occurred. 
5 2
Both of these approaches address the potential for confidentiality to
shield mediated agreements from effective redress of fraud and coercion; the
distinction between the two has to do with who and when. Is the fraudulent
behavior being engaged in by the party that is advantaged or disadvantaged
by the mediation settlement? Was the fraudulent behavior engaged in during
the mediation, or after the parties have reached a settlement? The above-
quoted scholars focus on the consequences of a legal rule under which a
party could intentionally employ fraudulent or coercive strategies in
mediation in order to gain an unfair advantage, and then use confidentiality
as a shield to enforce a suspect settlement agreement. The Kieturakis court
was concerned with the dangers of a legal rule under which a party
49. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 87.
50. Robinson, supra note 6, at 162.
51. Id. at 163.
52. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 86.
206
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disadvantaged by a settlement agreement could fraudulently claim duress in
order to invalidate a mediated agreement. The court's concentration on
preserving the validity of settlements is unsurprising given California's pro-
settlement policy, and the court's conclusion that more fraud would occur
under a presumptive rule that renders all unequal settlements voidable, than
under its own.
It is helpful to examine the Kieturakis decision in the context of the
national debate that is taking place within the ADR community as to
whether the rules governing confidentiality in mediation should be "bright-
lines" or whether they should call for case-by-case determination. On one
end of the spectrum, some argue that "[i]t is odd for ADR scholars to
advocate bright-line, legalistic rules to remedy problems created in a process
heralded because of its focus on self-determination. [Bright-line] rules...
do not allow for individual differences or assessments based on the unique
facts or personal choices made in each case."53  On the other end of the
spectrum is the view that uniformity in rules relating to mediation
confidentiality will help disputants and lawyers looking for confidentiality
know what they can expect from the mediation process, and will help to
protect mediators from being pulled out of the role of neutral and into
litigation.54 The Kieturakis decision is a firm rule that corresponds with the
argument in support of bright-line laws. Five years before the Kieturakis
decision, one scholar suggested the following alternative to the court's
approach to determining whether substantive policy or mediation
confidentiality should yield when the two conflict:
[A] bright-line rule is inappropriate in this situation [where mediation confidentiality and
other policies are in conflict] and courts should instead balance the need for mediation
evidence in the specific case against the harm that disclosure would cause to the purposes
served by confidentiality. Legislatures need to acknowledge the need for individualized
decisions on confidentiality in the context of contract defenses and set an appropriately
strict standard for disclosure. They should also mandate in camera methods, which can
protect confidentiality while a court evaluates the need for mediation confidentiality in
the world of contract doctrine. 55
53. Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated In Court-Connected Mediation-Tension
Between The Aspirations Of A Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial
Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 550 (2004).
54. See Mindy D. Rufenacht, The Concern Over Confidentiality in Mediation-An In-Depth
Look at the Protection Provided by the Proposed Uniform Mediation Act, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 113,
134(2000).
55. Deason, supra note 44, at 102.
9
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This proposal focuses on the area of law arguably most prone to conflict
with confidentiality in mediation: the common law of contracts. Such a
balancing test values the importance of confidentiality and contract law
equally, stressing the need for judicial discretion based on the circumstances
of each case, while insuring a basic level of confidentiality by calling for in
camera review of the confidential material.56  In other words, under a
balancing approach, even if a judge determined that the "need for mediation
evidence" outweighed the purposes served by confidentiality, the mediation
evidence in question would not become a matter of public record, but would
be disclosed to the judge(s) only.57 Though this may be of little consolation
to the party against whom mediation evidence is admitted to determine the
outcome of his or her case, it does afford more protection than would a rule
of bare disclosure. But would this minimal level of protection be enough?
The Kieturakis court did not comment on the possibility of applying this
"middle-ground" balancing approach, though it was no doubt familiar with
the notion, as the opinion quoted the article in which that approach was
proposed.58 Certainly, a rule that calls for case-by-case evaluation is less
straightforward than an absolute imperative, and could result in some degree
of judicial unpredictability and inconsistency. The question remains,
whether the flexibility gained by a balancing approach would outweigh the
loss of the full protection of confidentiality and the lack of a uniform legal
rule. Balancing approaches are by no means foreign to the judiciary;
however, it seems at least plausible that, were they to adopt such an
approach, California judges could use their discretion to shape a discernible
rule by identifying some specific factors relevant to each side of the balance.
V. OTHER APPROACHES: A COMPARATWE ANALYSIS
A. The Uniform Mediation Act
Some argue that the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) offers an
alternative that would accommodate both of the conflicting policies at issue
in Kieturakis.5 9 The UMA was drafted in 2001 by a joint effort of the ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, aided by an advisory faculty of
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56, 87 (Ct. App. 2006).
59. See Jeff Kichaven, Some New Thoughts About Mediation Confidentiality, INTERNATIONAL
RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Apr. 2006, http://www.irmi.com/Expert/Articles/2006/Kichaven04
.aspx.
208
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mediation scholars assembled from the law schools at Harvard, Ohio State
University, the University of Missouri-Columbia, and Bowdoin
University.6 ° States with strong histories of protecting confidentiality in
mediation, specifically California and Texas, have opted not to adopt the
UMA, criticizing its less vigorous confidentiality provisions. 61  Drafters
explain that the UMA was not drafted with states like California and Texas
in mind, but rather to provide a framework of rules for the many
jurisdictions that have no mediation confidentiality rules at all.62 Richard C.
Reuben, associate professor at the University of Missouri-Columbia School
of Law and the reporter for the UMA drafting committee, notes that "[the
UMA] was drafted for the 25 states that have no protection for mediation
confidentiality, and the other 10-15 that have very unclear, confusing and
often contradictory law regarding specific communications., 63 Currently,
nine states-Utah, Washington D.C., Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, Ohio, New
Jersey, Washington, and Vermont-have adopted the UMA, and it has been
introduced and is pending in four others: New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Minnesota. 64
For those who feel that adoption of the UMA's confidentiality
provisions would be beneficial even in California, the difficult intersection
of settlement enforcement and confidentiality is a key motivation. 65 Unlike
California's strict rule, the UMA "explicitly acknowledges that, at times,
mediation confidentiality must defer., 66 Among the situations for which the
UMA provides an exception to mediation confidentiality are cases in which
a party is seeking to "prove a claim to rescind or reform" a mediated
agreement, or to assert "a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out
of mediation, as in Kieturakis. This exception does not provide forunmitigated disclosure, however; there are several conditions that must be
60. Uniform Mediation Act, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/
uma/ (last visited Nov. 5 2007).
61. See Uniform Mediation Act Is Ready For Fall Examinations, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 198, 199 (Sept. 2001).
62. See UMA Position Emerges, Organizes, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 241, 242
(Nov. 2001).
63. Id.
64. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Fast Facts about the Uniform Mediation Act,
http://www.nccusi.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma2001 .asp (last visited Nov.
5, 2007).
65. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 168.
66. Robinson, supra note 6, at 168.
67. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(2) (2002).
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met in order for it to be successfully invoked. First, the UMA requires that
an in camera hearing regarding the circumstances surrounding the case be
performed by a court, arbitrator, or administrative agency. 68 The exception
will only extend to the case if this neutral reviewer finds: "that the party
seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the
evidence is not otherwise available, [and] that there is a need for the
evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting
confidentiality .... The scheme of this UMA exception to
confidentiality should not feel altogether foreign when held up to California
precedent. In the rare instances in which California mediation
confidentiality exceptions have been applied, in camera hearings have been
employed to reduce the extent of disclosure,7 ° and judges have required that
there be no available alternative source of evidence.71 However, the cases in
which these measures have been applied involved situations in which either
a party's constitutional rights were at stake,7 2 or the parties waived the
mediation privilege. 7
B. Other States'Approaches
This article is concerned with the specific issue of how California has
handled the issue of first impression raised in Kieturakis. Though other
states' precedent is not binding authority in California, an examination of
how other jurisdictions have dealt with comparable issues is, nonetheless,
instructive, given the relative paucity of precedent in this area.
1. Texas
Texas is recognized as a state with broad statutory protection for
mediation confidentiality. 74 The Texas ADR Act provides for a few narrow
exceptions to confidentiality, including "when the parties execute a written
settlement agreement at the mediation session and one of the parties later
brings a contract enforcement action on the agreement. 7 5 In the unreported
68. Id. at § 6(b).
69. Id.
70. See Rinaker v. Super. Ct., 62 Cal. App. 4th 155-56 (Ct. App. 1998); see also Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
71. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
72. See Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 160-61.
73. SeeOlam, 68F. Supp. 2dat 1118-19.
74. Brian D. Shannon, Confidentiality Of Texas Mediations: Ruminations On Some Thorny
Problems, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 77, 77 (2000).
75. Shannon, supra note 74, at 77, 92.
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case of Randle v. Mid Gulf Inc., a Texas court of appeals applied an
estoppel approach to the issue of whether confidential evidence is admissible
to prove a contract defense to an enforcement action on a mediated
settlement.76 Notwithstanding the lack of a pertinent formal exception to
confidentiality, the court held that a party may not move to enforce a
mediated agreement and simultaneously claim the protection of mediation
confidentiality to prevent the other side from establishing a contract
defense.77 Eight years later, in Alford v. Bryant, a Texas court of appeals
extended the "offensive use doctrine" to mediation confidentiality.7 ' Texas'
offensive use doctrine provides that:
[A defendant] cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in search of affirmative relief,
and yet, on the basis of privilege, deny a party the benefit of evidence that would
materially weaken or defeat the claims against her... [because] [s]uch offensive ... use
of a privilege lies outside the intended scope of the privilege.
7 9
Though mediation confidentiality did not have the status of a privilege
in Texas, the Alford court held that "[b]ecause the mediation confidentiality
statutes and the attomey-client privilege are grounded upon similar policy
rationales, including effective legal services and administration of justice,
the offensive use doctrine should apply similarly to the mediation
confidentiality statutes."8 ° Three conditions must be met in order for the
doctrine to apply: 1) the party asserting the privilege must be "seeking
affirmative relief," 2) the privileged information must be, "in all
probability.., outcome determinative" of the asserted claim for relief, and
3) disclosure of the confidential information must be "the only means by
which the aggrieved party may obtain the evidence. '81
Neither Randle nor Alford deal with the exact scenario of Kieturakis, in
which a party sought to invalidate a mediated settlement by asserting that a
presumption of undue influence applied, but simultaneously refused to
waive confidentiality, effectively preventing the other side from being able
to meet his burden of proof. To recap, Randle bars a party seeking to
enforce a mediated settlement from refusing to waive confidentiality at the
76. Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug.
8, 1996).
77. Randle, 1996 WL 447954, at * 1.
78. Alford v. Bryant, 137 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Tex. App. 2004).
79. Id. at 921 (citing Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1985)).
80. Alford, 137 S.W.3d at 922.
81. Id. at 921 (citing TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Flores, 870 S.W.2d 10, 11-12 (Tex.
1994)).
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expense of the other party's ability to assert a contract defense. Alford bars a
party asserting a claim for affirmative relief from refusing to waive
confidentiality to prevent the other party from admitting evidence from
mediation likely to be outcome determinative in the new action. However,
unlike the Kieturakis court,82 these Texas cases recognize the argument that
a party may waive mediation confidentiality by virtue of having asserted
certain claims against the other party. Maciej Kieturakis made this argument
in his trial brief as he sought to admit evidence from mediation in order to
refute the presumption of undue influence being asserted against him.
8 3
However, the Kieturakis court rejected this line of reasoning, relying on
prior California precedent that held that the mediation privilege cannot be
impliedly waived, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the confidential
marital communication privilege, the physician-patient privilege, and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.84 The court also noted that "[s]ome of the
other privileges are also expressly subject to the 'in issue' doctrine, which
creates an implied waiver when the holder of the privilege raises an issue
involving the substance of protected communications," but was clear in its
reading of past precedent, saying "[t]he court declined to 'extend these
waiver provisions beyond their existing limits' to reach the mediation
privilege.85
2. West Virginia
The question of the appropriate relationship between mediated
settlement agreements and traditional contract law principles inevitably
raises the issue of whether a mediator's testimony should ever be compelled
to prove the invalidity (or validity, as in Kieturakis) of an agreement. As a
neutral party, theoretically unbiased to either side's vision of the case, a
mediator's perspective would no doubt be useful evidence to a court in
determining the fairness of a mediated agreement. This fact is exactly why
mediators are covered by confidentiality provisions-the same position of
neutrality that makes a mediator a uniquely appealing witness is what allows
her to effectively facilitate the resolution of conflict. Without the safeguard
of confidentiality, however, parties would not be able to participate in
mediation without the very legitimate fear that everything they said could be
used against them later in court. West Virginia is an example of a state with
82. In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56, 81 (Ct. App. 2006).
83. Id. at 68 ("Maciej's trial brief argued among other things that [the other side] had waived
the mediation privilege given the nature of the claims she was asserting.").
84. Id. at 81 (citing Eisendrath v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. App. 4th 351 (Ct. App. 2003)).
85. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 81 (quoting Eisendrath, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 363).
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a strict mediator privilege that "appears to prohibit mediator testimony in
nearly every circumstance." 86 However, West Virginia law also states that
"[i]f the parties reach a settlement and execute a written agreement, the
agreement is enforceable in the same manner as any other written
contract."8 7 The potential for conflict between these rules calls into question
the difficult issue of whether and when mediator testimony is appropriately
compelled. In Riner v. Newbraugh, the parties reached an agreement in
mediation, but a dispute over enforcement arose after one of the parties
made changes to the terms of the agreement, and the other party refused to
sign the new document.18  The trial court compelled the mediator's
testimony, and relied heavily on it in finding that the agreement was valid
and enforceable.8 9 On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
invalidated the agreement on contract law grounds, but also took pains to
disapprove of the trial court's decision to compel the mediator's testimony. 90
The court's opinion suggests that mediators can testify only as to whether an
agreement was reached and the terms thereof, but should not be subjected to
specific questioning about the details of the mediation process. 91 In other
words, strict confidentiality is ostensibly still the governing standard for
mediator testimony in West Virginia in the wake of Riner.
As outlined in section III above, the Kieturakis court held that the trial
court's decision to compel the mediator's testimony was harmless error, if it
was an error at all. 92 Like the Riner court, the Kieturakis court did express
doubt about the applicability of the exception as applied by the trial court
despite its judgment not to formally decide the issue. 93 The extent to which
California will continue to recognize, extend, or limit exceptions to the
general rule against mediator testimony remains to be seen.
86. Joshua S. Rogers, Riner v. Newbraugh: The Role of Mediator Testimony in the
Enforcement of Mediated Agreements, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 329, 346 (2004).
87. Id. at 347 (quoting w. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.14).
88. Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 804-05 (W. Va. 2002).
89. Id. at 805.
90. Id. at 808-09 ("[W]e question the wisdom of permitting the mediator to testify in the
fashion allowed in this case.").
91. See Riner, 563 S.E.2d 802; see also Rogers, supra note 86, at 349-50.
92. See In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56, 94 (Ct. App. 2006).
93. Id. ("[W]e do not think that Olam could be stretched so far as to cover the situation the
trial court faced here, where one of the parties objected to the mediator's evidence... .
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VI. To WHAT DEGREE SHOULD A MEDIATOR BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE FAIRNESS OF A SETTLEMENT?
A mediator's job is to serve as a neutral facilitator and to help disputing
parties discuss the relevant issues and decide for themselves if and how they
want to resolve the dispute. But when it comes to the substantive terms of
settlement, is the mediator responsible for ensuring that an agreement is fair
to both sides? Predictably, there is some disagreement on this subject. 94
This section will consider the various approaches to the topic of the
appropriate standards of practice for mediators. It will also broach the
subject of whether holdings such as Kieturakis increase mediators'
responsibility for ensuring the fairness of settlements.
A. Standards of Practice for Mediation
As mediation has become more institutionalized and linked to the court
system, courts have begun to add ADR-specific standards of practice to their
court rules. 95 Many independent mediation associations and organizations
have also drafted model standards based on their expertise and practical
experience in the field; 96  some of these standards are eventually
incorporated in part or in full into state law.
1. Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation
One model relevant to the topic of this article is the Model Standards of
Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation (Model Family Mediation
Standards), developed by the Symposium on Standards of Practice in
2000.9' The Model Family Mediation Standards begin by recognizing that
94. Compare Andrew Schepard, An Introduction to the Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation, 35 FAM. L.Q. 1, 17 (2001) ("[M]ediators have some responsibility
under the Model Standards to help insure minimum fairness in both the process of bargaining and
substantive outcomes....") with CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3.857(b) (2003) (amended 2007) ("A
mediator is not obligated to ensure the substantive fairness of an agreement reached by the parties.").
95. See, e.g., Boise State University, Department of Public Policy and Administration,
Overview of States' Codes of Mediator Ethics, http://ppa.boisestate.edu/mediation/documents/table-
a.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
96. See, e.g., California Dispute Resolution Council, http://www.mediate.com/articles/
cdrcstds.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007); Iowa Association for Dispute Resolution,
http://iamediators.org/standards.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007); Maine Association of Dispute
Resolution Professionals, http://www.madrp.org/ethics/index/html (last visited Oct 28, 2007).
97. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (2000),
http://www.afccnet.org/resources/resources.model-mediation.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2007)
(hereinafter MODEL FAMILY MEDIATION STANDARDS).
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"[s]elf-determination is the fundamental principle of family mediation. The
mediation process relies upon the ability of participants to make their own
voluntary and informed decisions." '  Rooted in this guiding principle of
party autonomy, mediators are expected to uphold several responsibilities.
First, mediators "should be alert to the capacity and willingness of the
participants to mediate before proceeding with the mediation and throughout
the process." 99 The Model Family Mediation Standards also require that the
mediator "facilitate full and accurate disclosure ... of information during
mediation so that the participants can make informed decisions."' 00 These
responsibilities are procedural duties, but the Model Family Mediation
Standards also call for the mediator to monitor the substantive outcome of a
case: a mediator "should consider suspending or terminating the
mediation... [if] the participants are about to enter into an agreement that
the mediator reasonably believes to be unconscionable."10' As one scholar
has explained, "[t]his provision imposes a requirement on the mediator to
insure that an agreement that results from mediation is not so unfair that it
shocks the conscience ... or because the substantive terms are so wildly
unfair that no reasonable person would enter into them."'10 2  This
unconscionability standard is designed to ensure that mediators endorse only
those settlement agreements that satisfy minimum standards of fairness; "it
does not require that the terms of a mediated agreement be identical to those
that would be achieved in a court order after years of discovery and
litigation. "'03
2. California Rules of Court: Requirements for the Quality of the
Mediation Process in Civil Cases
Under California Rule of Court 3.857(b), "[a] mediator must conduct the
mediation proceedings in a procedurally fair manner. 'Procedural fairness'
means a balanced process in which each party is given an opportunity to
participate and make uncoerced decisions. A mediator is not obligated to
ensure the substantive fairness of an agreement reached by the parties." 104
98. Id. Standard I.A.
99. Id. Standard II1.C.
100. Id. Standard VIA.
101. Id. Standard XI.A.4.
102. Schepard, supra note 94, at 15.
103. Schepard, supra note 94, at 15-16.
104. CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3.857(b) (2003) (amended 2007) (emphasis added).
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The only additional provision that speaks to a mediator's proper response to
possible unfairness in the mediation process is Rule 3.857(i), which
indicates that:
[A] mediator may suspend or terminate the mediation or withdraw as mediator when he
or she reasonably believes the circumstances require it, including when he or she suspects
that: 1) [t]he mediation is being used to further illegal conduct; 2) [a] participant is unable
to participate meaningfully in negotiations; or 3) [c]ontinuation of the process would
cause significant harm to any participant or a third party. 105
Here, the mediator has discretion as to whether or not to withdraw,
rather than being obligated to do so.
3. Mediators Responsibility for Fairness in Mediation Based on
Professional Background
Another model for determining mediator responsibility for fairness in
mediation is based on the mediator's professional background. 106 Under this
view, "[t]he extent of mediator accountability for fairness varies by whether
or not the mediator is a lawyer, and by whether the parties are independently
represented by counsel."'0 7  This idea is based on the ethical restrictions
specific to attorneys' involvement in alternative dispute resolution
processes. 108 In contrast, the Model Family Mediation Standards specifically
provide that they "apply to all mediators-lawyers and therapists alike-
regardless of the mediator's profession of origin."'0 9 This second approach
is arguably the better rule, given that many accomplished mediators are not
lawyers, and because having separate standards for fairness for different
mediators would likely lead to inconsistent results both in mediation and in
subsequent court proceedings.
B. Mediator Responsibility for Procedural vs. Substantive Fairness
As demonstrated by the above examples, different standards of practice
assume different positions as to whether mediators are responsible for
substantive as well as procedural fairness in mediation. This is a debate that
has developed relatively recently; "[u]nder traditional mediation theory,
mediator accountability is satisfied by a procedurally fair process that treats
105. Id. at Rule 3.857(i) (2003) (amended 2007).
106. See Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator
Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 503,508 (1991).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Schepard, supra note 94, at 7.
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parties with dignity and respect, and that stops intimidating or abusive
behavior."" °  As for substantive outcome, under a traditional approach,
"[a]bsent abuse of the mediation process, any settlement the parties agree to
is deemed fair ...""' Though the terms "intimidating" or "abusive" are
somewhat ambiguous, the boundary of mediator responsibility under this
view extends only to the procedural aspects of mediation. California
adheres to this more traditional approach, while the Model Family Mediation
Standards call for a mediator to venture out into the task of distinguishing
unconscionable agreement terms from those that are voluntarily entered into,
without abuse of the process by either party. 112
C. Does Kieturakis Increase Mediator Responsibility for the Fairness of
Mediated Settlements?
In Kieturakis, the court chose not to apply the presumption of undue
influence to mediated settlement agreements." 3 Ultimately, this shifted the
burden of proving undue influence from the alleged perpetrator to the party
seeking to invalidate the mediated agreement. The court's opinion also
established different standards of treatment for mediated and non-mediated
settlement agreements under the law. Because of California's strict
mediation confidentiality provisions, a mediation participant who wishes to
challenge the validity of an agreement on a claim of undue influence may be
unable to do so, if the other party refuses to waive the mediation privilege.
This consequence of Kieturakis makes the fairness of both the process and
substance of mediation even more critical, as there is far less chance of
recourse after the fact. This result raises a new question: Does the
heightened need for fairness during mediation puts additional pressure on
mediators to ensure that the terms of an agreement are fair? On the one
hand, California's Rules of Court clearly state that California mediators are
not responsible for the substantive fairness of mediation. 14 On the other
hand, the Kieturakis court relied on the assertion that a mediator's successful
preservation of procedural fairness makes substantive fairness a more likely
110. Maute, supra note 106, at 506 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. See supra Part V.A. 1-2.
113. See supra Part I11.
114. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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result, as well. 5 On this basis, the court opined that, "while mediation is no
guarantee against the exercise of undue influence, it should help to minimize
unfairness in the process by which a marital settlement is reached.""16
Ultimately, whether a mediator's responsibility for fairness is increased
comes down to the rather inane question of how fair is fair; are there
gradations of effort that a mediator can put forth in the pursuit of ensuring
procedural fairness? If so, perhaps a mediator is required, post-Kieturakis,
to act at the very zenith of her efforts to ensure procedural fairness, so as to
have the best chance of minimizing substantive unfairness. This argument is
a stretch, at best. It seems far more plausible that California's requirement
that "a mediator must conduct the mediation proceedings in a procedurally
fair manner"" 7 means just what it says, and does not contemplate degrees of
procedural fairness. Thus, though Kieturakis leaves parties to mediation less
protected from the threat of undue influence, it does not increase mediator
responsibility for fairness, because mediators were already required to act
within their full power to ensure procedural fairness. Kieturakis does not
alter California's stance that mediators are "not obligated to ensure the
substantive fairness of an agreement reached by the parties."'' 8
VII. CONCLUSION
The Kieturakis opinion both maintains California's historically strict
standard of confidentiality and reduces the scope of the state's presumption
that unequal marital settlements were achieved through undue influence. 19
There is a strong argument that the court could have more effectively
honored both the conflicting policy of mediation confidentiality and the
substantive family and contract law presumption of undue influence, by
establishing a balancing test and calling for in camera review. However, it
is unclear whether the practical result of such a decision would have
undermined the state's confidentiality protection to an unacceptable degree.
It is no wonder that the trial court in Kieturakis described the issues
presented in the case as "the most difficult it had ever faced."' 120 Whether
115. In re Marriage of Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th 56, 85 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[D]ivorce
mediators generally work to balance the negotiating power between the parties. This tends to
produce agreements that are more fair and voluntary, rather than coerced." (quoting ROTH ET Al.,
THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § 31:5 at 31-5 (Lawyers Cooperative
Publishing Co. 2005)).
116. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 85.
117. CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3.857(b) (2003) (amended 2007).
118. Id.
119. See supra Parts III and IV.
120. Kieturakis, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 75.
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the court of appeal's strict adherence to confidentiality will discourage
parties from participating in mediation, whether it was "necessary to protect
the mediation process,"' 2' 1 or whether it will result in a legacy of "absurd
enforcement results" will only be apparent with the passage of time (and
litigation). 122
121. Robinson, supra note 6, at 142.
122. Id. at 148.
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